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ABSTRACT—When learning new words, do children use
a speaker’s eye gaze because it reveals referential intent?
We conducted two experiments that addressed this ques-
tion. In Experiment 1, the experimenter left while two
novel objects were placed where the child could see both,
but the experimenter would be able to see only one. The
experimenter returned, looked directly at the mutually
visible object, and said either, ‘‘There’s the [novel word]!’’
or ‘‘Where’s the [novel word]?’’ Two- through 4-year-olds
selected the target of the speaker’s gaze more often on there
trials than on where trials, although only the older chil-
dren identified the referent correctly at above-chance
levels on trials of both types. In Experiment 2, the exper-
imenter placed a novel object where only the child could see
it and left while the second object was similarly hidden.
When she returned and asked, ‘‘Where’s the [novel word]?’’
2- through 4-year-olds chose the second object at above-
chance levels. Preschoolers do not blindly follow gaze, but
consider the linguistic and pragmatic context when learning
a new word.
When learning an object name, young children often assume
that the name refers to the object the speaker is looking at, even
if the children themselves are looking at a different object when
the word is used (e.g., Baldwin, 1991). Eye gaze cannot be a
necessary cue for word learning; blind children can learn object
names, after all, and children can infer that a word refers to an
object even if the speaker is not looking at it (e.g., through
mutual exclusivity—Markman & Wachtel, 1988; when learning
names for absent referents—Akhtar & Tomasello, 1996). Even
so, eye gaze does seem to be sufficient for word learning.
What does this indicate about how children learn the mean-
ings of words? Such results are often taken as demonstrating the
importance of social cognition in word learning, under the as-
sumption that children use a speaker’s eye gaze as a cue to
referential intent (e.g., Bloom, 2000). According to another ac-
count, however, children attend to a speaker’s line of regard be-
cause of simpler, possibly unlearned, orienting responses (e.g.,
Moore & Corkum, 1994; but see Woodward, 2003); once they
have done so, they come to associate the object they are attend-
ing to and the word they are hearing (Smith, Jones, & Landau,
1996; Plunkett, 1997). The precise details of such claims differ,
but they share the view that, regardless of what role social cog-
nition plays in other aspects of word learning, this primary and
early-emerging sensitivity to eye gaze is unmediated by any
inferences about the speaker’s referential intent.
The two accounts can be distinguished by what they predict
about how mandatory this sensitivity to eye gaze is. If children
use gaze cues out of an understanding that eye gaze reflects the
speaker’s meaning, gaze information should be exploited when it
reveals the speaker’s intent, but ignored when it is irrelevant or
uninformative. We tested this hypothesis in two studies.
EXPERIMENT 1: VISUAL PERSPECTIVE
In Experiment 1, the child and the speaker explored two nov-
el unnamed objects together. Then, in the speaker’s absence,
the objects were placed such that the speaker would be able to
see only one of them, although the child could see both. The
speaker returned, looked at the mutually visible object, and
said, ‘‘There’s the [novel word]!’’ or ‘‘Where’s the [novel word]?’’
If children mandatorily follow eye gaze to a target object when
learning a new word, they would be expected to map the word to
the mutually visible object in both conditions. Alternatively, if
children are sensitive to the speaker’s visual perspective and use
gaze information in word learning only when it is informative,
they would be expected to disregard eye-gaze cues on where
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Thirty-two older children (M 5 49 months, range 5 46–54
months; 16 boys and 16 girls) and 32 younger children (M5 31
months, range 5 25–36 months; 13 boys and 19 girls) were
tested in a university lab or at their day-care center.
Materials
We used an opaque cardboard screen (32 cm  22 cm) con-
taining two compartments, one with and the other without a
window. This screen was placed between the child and the
speaker so that the child could see into both compartments, but
the speaker could see only through the window into one com-
partment.
We used four pairs of novel objects, and the novel labels
spoodle, nurmy, flurg, and gorp. The target object, its location
relative to the window, and the left/right position of the window
in the screen were all counterbalanced.
Procedure
In the familiarization phase, each participant was shown what
the screen looked like from both sides. Two familiar toys were
placed on the child’s side of the screen, one in each compart-
ment. The child was asked to identify which toy the speaker
could see, and which she could not see. The screen was then
rotated so that the child had the speaker’s perspective and could
see only the object in the window.
In the experimental phase, there were twowhere trials and two
there trials, identical except for the test question. On each trial,
the child explored a pair of novel objects with two adults (the
speaker and the assistant). The speaker left the room or turned
her back while the assistant placed each object in its compart-
ment. From the child’s perspective, both objects were visible,
one in the compartment with the window and the other in the
compartment without the window. When the speaker returned
(or turned around), only the object in the window was visible
from her perspective (see Fig. 1). She fixed her gaze on the object
in the window and asked the test question: On there trials, the
speaker said, ‘‘Oh! There’s the [novel label]! There it is!’’
On where trials, she said, ‘‘Oh! Where’s the [novel label]? Where
is it?’’
In both conditions, the speaker then looked up at the child,
held out her hand, and asked, ‘‘Can I have the [novel label]?’’
Results and Discussion
Older children correctly selected the mutually visible object on
an average of 1.53 of the 2 there trials, whereas younger children
averaged 1.38 correct there trials. Both levels of performance
were above chance, ts(31)5 4.48 and 3.00, preps5 .996 and .97,
respectively. On there trials, the speaker’s eye gaze was directed
at the correct target, and both older and younger children cor-
rectly used this cue to identify the referent.
Older children correctly selected the hidden object on an
average of 1.41 of the 2 where trials, whereas younger children
averaged 1.00 correct where trials. Only older children’s per-
formance was consistently above chance level, t(31) 5 3.23,
prep 5 .97. On where trials, the speaker’s gaze information was
uninformative, as it was directed at an incorrect object. Older
children were able to disregard these gaze cues and identify the
correct referent, although the younger children were not.
To determine whether children in each age group selected the
visible object more often on there trials (when it was correct) than
on where trials (when it was incorrect), we gave each participant
a score of 1 if he or she selected the visible object more often on
there trials and a score of 1 if he or she selected the visible
object more often on where trials. Sign tests revealed that par-
ticipants in both age groups showed the correct pattern of
responses; both the older and the younger children selected
the visible object more often on there trials than on where trials,
ps < .05.
Children at both ages appear to have used the adult’s eye-gaze
cues flexibly, relying on gaze direction to map the novel word
only when gaze direction was informative. The younger children,
although uncertain of the correct answer in the where condition,
nevertheless did not err by selecting the target of the speaker’s
eye gaze when it was uninformative. The older children appear
to have determined the speaker’s referential intent in the where
condition.
Fig. 1. The event shown during Experiment 1, with sample novel ob-
jects. On all trials, the experimenter fixed her gaze on the object in the
window. On there trials, the experimenter said, ‘‘There’s the [spoodle/
nurmy/flurg/gorp]! There it is!’’ On where trials, she asked, ‘‘Where’s
the [spoodle/nurmy/flurg/gorp]? Where is it?’’
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An alternative analysis, however, is that the older children
employed the strategy of selecting any object that was hidden
from the speaker when asked a where question. That is, rather
than making an inference about referential intent, they might
have simply responded to this sort of question by looking for a
hidden object. We explored this alternative in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2: KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE
Method
Participants
Eighteen older children (M 5 46 months, range 5 41–56
months; 11 boys and 7 girls) and 18 younger children (M 5 31
months, range5 29–33 months; 9 boys and 9 girls) were tested
in a university lab or their day-care center. No child participated
in both experiments.
Materials
An opaque cardboard screen (33 cm 25 cm) was used. Objects
placed behind the screen were visible to the child, but not to the
speaker seated on the opposite side (see Fig. 2). We used three
pairs of novel objects, and the novel labels fendle, nurmy, and
toma. Each object served as target and as distractor an equal
number of times.
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, in the familiarization phase of Experiment
2, participants were introduced to the screen from the speaker’s
and the child’s perspective.
There were two knowledge trials and one control trial, iden-
tical except for the timing of the placement of the objects. On all
trials, the child first explored a pair of novel objects with the
speaker and the assistant. On knowledge trials, the speaker then
placed one of the objects on the child’s side of the screen, where
the child could see it but the speaker could not. The other object
remained in plain view as the speaker left or turned her back,
at which point the assistant placed it behind the screen. Both
objects were therefore hidden to the speaker, but she knew the
location of one of them because she had placed it behind the
screen herself. The speaker returned (or turned around), feigned
surprise, and asked, ‘‘Where is the [novel label]? Where is it?’’
She held out her hand and asked, ‘‘Can I have the [novel label]?’’
The control trial was identical, except that both objects were
placed behind the screen in the speaker’s absence, and she
could be seen as ignorant about the location of both.
The control trial appeared equally often as the first, last, or
middle trial. Only one control trial was used because pilot test-
ing revealed that children found the trial frustrating, as there
was no clear correct answer.
Results and Discussion
On knowledge trials, the speaker was ignorant of the location of
the object that was hidden second, in her absence. Children
received a point each time they correctly selected this object, for
a possible maximum score of 2. Children occasionally selected
both objects (2 older children on a total of three trials, 1 younger
child on one trial). This response was coded as incorrect, as
the object hidden second was not chosen as the sole referent of
the target word. The average scores were 1.72 for older chil-
dren and 1.61 for younger children. Children in both age groups
answered correctly significantly more often than predicted by
chance, ts(17) 5 5.33 and 5.17, respectively, preps 5 .996.
On the control trial, the speaker was ignorant of the location of
both objects. On this trial, many children responded by selecting
both objects (8 older and 5 younger children). Of the children
who selected only one object, 4 of 10 older children and 8 of 13
younger children chose the object hidden second, a level of
performance no different from chance, w2(1, N 5 14) 5 0.4,
p > .53, and w2(1, N 5 13) 5 0.7, p > .40, respectively.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our experiments, children ages 2 to 4 were able to take the
perspective of a speaker (Experiments 1 and 2), and 3- to 4-year-
olds were able to override eye-gaze cues when they were not
relevant (Experiment 1). These findings might seem surprising,
given that older children and adults have difficulty with simi-
lar tasks. For example, Epley, Morewedge, and Keysar (2004)
explored perspective taking by having a speaker ask partici-
pants to move objects from one location to another in an upright
array of boxes. They found that 6-year-olds and even adults often
failed to take into account the speaker’s visual perspective, re-
sponding as if the speaker could see an object that was visible
Fig. 2. The event shown during Experiment 2, with sample novel ob-
jects. On all trials, the experimenter asked, ‘‘Where’s the [fendle/nurmy/
toma]? Where is it?’’
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only to the participant (but see Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). This task
differs from our own in that it involves a much more complex
array of objects and requires participants to determine the ref-
erents of existing words, not to make sense of new ones. Our
study shows that 4-year-olds, and to some extent 2-year-olds, are
able to consider the speaker’s perspective in a referential task
when given a simpler context.
Our findings are consistent with those of Moll and Tomasello
(2006), who found that when an adult asked for help searching
for an object, 2-year-olds did not offer the object in plain view,
but instead fetched the object visible to the child but hidden
from the adult. In this task, however, the adult’s eye gaze alter-
nated between the visible object and the location of the hidden
object, whereas in the parallel condition in our Experiment 1,
the adult’s eye gaze was directed at the mutually visible non-
target object, making the mapping problem more difficult. Al-
though 2-year-olds were not able to correctly select the hidden
object on these trials, as a group they did not mistakenly map the
novel word to the target of the adult’s gaze.
These findings provide support for a pragmatic approach to
word learning, in which children do not simply follow surface
cues to the speaker’s referential intent, but instead seek to un-
derstand the situation as a whole. Studies consistent with this
perspective have shown that somewhat older children do not
learn a new label despite clear referential cues toward a novel
object when the reliability of the speaker is called into question.
For example, Koenig and Harris (2005) showed that 4-year-olds,
and in some cases 3-year-olds, preferred to learn a novel label
from a previously reliable speaker rather than from one who
claimed ignorance of the names of familiar objects or who la-
beled them inaccurately (see also Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom,
in press; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Nurmsoo & Robinson, in press).
And Sabbagh and Baldwin (2001) found that when a speaker
explicitly claimed ignorance about the correct referent of a novel
word (e.g., ‘‘I don’t know what a blicket is. Maybe it’s this one.’’),
3- and 4-year-olds did not learn the word. The present set of
studies adds to this body of research, by showing that even when
faced with a speaker who shows every sign of competent naming,
and no uncertainty about the meaning of a novel label, children
do not rely solely on eye-gaze cues to determine the referent of
the new word, but use additional pragmatic or linguistic infor-
mation to infer the correct target.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that when two objects were hid-
den from the speaker, who could be seen as ignorant about the
location of only one of them, 2- to 4-year-olds correctly identi-
fied the speaker’s intended referent when she asked, ‘‘Where is
the [novel word]?’’ This finding converges with research sug-
gesting that children use other cues to a speaker’s referential
intent when eye-gaze information is not sufficient. For example,
when preschoolers are told, ‘‘Let’s find the toma,’’ they will map
toma to the object that satisfies the searcher even when multiple
novel objects are examined (and rejected; Tomasello & Barton,
1994) or when the unseen novel object is hidden in a locked toy
barn (Akhtar & Tomasello, 1996). Somewhat older children are
sensitive to a speaker’s false beliefs when interpreting the
meaning of a novel word used to refer to the contents of a con-
tainer, mapping the word to the object that the speaker falsely
believes is hidden within (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002;
Happe & Loth, 2002).
There is considerable evidence, then, that children will track
other cues to a speaker’s referential intent when there are no eye-
gaze cues that can be used to identify the correct target. We have
shown here that preschoolers are sensitive to a speaker’s refer-
ential intent even when eye-gaze cues are present and directed
at an incorrect target. Preschoolers do not blindly follow the
direction of gaze.
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